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Abstract   The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between 
corporate governance and Shariah governance, and how those gover-
nance concepts are handled at Islamic financial institutions. 
Although using the same word “governance,” Western corporate 
governance and Islamic Shariah governance may be different.   The main 
research question is how different or similar are governance at conven-
tional banks and Shariah governance at Islamic banks?   We would like 
to find an answer to this question by undertaking a comparative analy-
sis of widely accepted guidelines.   There is limited analytical work in 
the existing literature on this simple question.   This study is unique in 
that it presents a critical comparative analytical perspectives of a veteran 
practitioner in the Western banking industry2, 3. 
In order to clarify the relationship of several governance concepts, 
we first review the concept of corporate governance that originated 
in Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).   
Then, we explain how the corporate governance concept was forwarded 
to the conventional banking industry and then how it is introduced to 
the Islamic banking industry.   Following that, we examine the Shariah 
governance concept at Islamic banks.   The analytical findings show that 
Shariah governance is a concept that comes first at Islamic banks.   Our 
analysis shows that actual Shariah governance practice, however, looks 
to be limited to exercising Shariah compliance.   Furthermore, for the 
1.  Representative Director, PNB Asset Management (Japan) Co. Ltd. and Visiting Fellow, 
Reitaku Institute of Political Economics and Social Studies. The views express here are solely 
those of the author in his private capacity and do not in any way represent the views of PNB 
Asset Management (Japan) Co. Ltd.
2.  For example, Islamic Finance Principles and Practice by Hans Vissar (2009), a popular book 
on Islamic Finance does not mention Shari’ah governance. Another example, Critical Issues on 
Islamic Banking and Financial Markets by Saiful Azhar Rosly (2005), a popular textbook on Islamic 
banking in Malaysia, discusses Islamic Corporate Governance in three pages of his 618-page 
book.
3.  The word “conventional” is used to mean Western style banking, which uses the concept 
of interest.
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purpose of understanding the degree of non-compliant risk, three cases 
of Shariah compliant risk are analyzed.
Lastly, we explain the current development of governance in West-
ern countries.   Governance has evolved from passive to active.   An 
expanded interpretation of corporate governance has become popular 
particularly in the context of corporate social responsibility (CSR).   New 
concepts such as creating shared value (CSV) and Impact Investing 
have been increasingly recognized.   In this context, while it has become 
evident that Western capitalism is trying to find ways to realize social 
justice and welfare, but neither of which has been its main purpose.   On 
the contrary, Shariah governance is narrowly focused on Shariah compli-
ance, and its function at financial institutions looks passive. 
Key Words:  Islamic finance, corporate governance, Shariah governance, 
Shariah compliance, CSR
Interdisciplinary Fields:  International economics, International finance 
Introduction:  The Development of Islamic Finance
Islamic finance has been expanding throughout the world mainly due to an 
increase in the Islamic population and the economic development of Islamic 
nations.   Islamic finance is gaining attention from Western financial circles 
because of its development as a source of additional revenue and because 
its unique concepts backed by actual transactions provides as an alternative 
to the Western financial system.   
The increasing Muslim population is a key factor.   Currently estimated 
to be 1.6 billion, within 10 years, one in three of the total world population 
will be Muslim.   The size of Islamic finance is said to be around US$1.631 
trillion with an annualized growth rate of 20.4% for the past five years as of 
the end of March 20124.   The total size is smaller than the size of the world’s 
largest financial institutions, with 18 banks in the world having assets of 
more than US$1.631 trillion, according to The Banker’s magazine’s world 
ranking of banks 2013.
Here, we summarize Islamic finance concepts.   Islamic finance is a 
way to accommodate the values of Islam in finance.   It is based on Islamic 
law, or Shariah, which is designed to promote social and economic jus-
tice.   Shariah is known for prohibiting interest or usury (Riba), speculation 
or gambling (Maisir), excessive risk or uncertainty (Gharar) and oppressive 
practices.   Muslims must evaluate business activities to determine whether 
the business is Halal (“just” or “lawful”), which can be handled, or Haram 
4.  Data from Edbiz Consulting (2013) Global Islamic Finance Report 2013.
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(“unjust” or “sinful”), which cannot be handled in financing.   Haram busi-
ness activities include the manufacturing or marketing of products such as 
alcohol, gambling or gambling activities, pork and pork products, certain 
forms of adult entertainment.
It is important to mention that Shariah specifies no finance is given 
without actual contracts unless and until all contracts meet the following 
requirements: (i) there must be a minimum of two parties to an arrange-
ment; (ii) the product must be real and must be owned by one party; (iii) 
there must be an offer and an acceptance of the offer; (iv) all parties must 
fully agree to the deal’s purpose and terms; (v) the price must be agreed on 
mutually, with no party subject to duress; (vi) there must be no undue bur-
den on one party to the advantage of another; (vii) the term must be in ac-
cordance with other Shariah principles5.   For example, a contract involving 
a prohibited product such as alcohol or pork would not be acceptable.
In addition to qualitative restrictions, three types of quantitative re-
strictions are widely applied in investment activities.   The first one is debt 
availed by the company.   This restriction is to exclude companies where 
interest-bearing debt liabilities exceed or equal one third (1/3) of the compa-
ny’s total assets or market capitalization (depending on methodology used). 
This test is not applicable to Shariah compliant financing.   Secondly, cash 
plus interest-bearing securities of the company.   This criteria is to exclude 
companies where cash plus interest-bearing securities exceed or equal one 
third (1/3) of the company’s total assets or market capitalization (depend-
ing on methodology used).   This test is not applicable to Shariah compliant 
financing.   Thirdly, extent of cash and receivables with the company.   In Is-
lamic finance, debt and cash can only be traded at par.   Therefore cash plus 
receivables must be less than 33% of market capitalization.
Contemporary Islamic finance has been a quest for an alternative to 
conventional financing, which is composed of interest-bearing loans and 
transactions.   This is achieved through the use of various Islamic contracts 
such as sales, leases and partnerships since the beginning of Shariah history. 
Islamic financing typically takes the form of (i) sales-purchase, and (ii) risk-
sharing investments.   The use of these contracts in Islamic finance means a 
whole new way of doing business be it in banking, capital market transac-
tions or insurance.   The desire for financing modes and investment vehicles 
that are in accordance with Shariah principles has impacted the growth of 
Islamic finance today.   “Shariah governance” is typically described as “a set 
of institutional and organisational arrangements through which Islamic 
5.  Concept of Islamic finance is from Virginia B. Morris, 2009, A Muslim’s Guide to Invest-
ment & Personal Finance, Lightbulb Press.
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Financial Institutions (IFIs) ensure that there is an effective independent 
oversight of Shariah compliance over the issuance of relevant Shariah pro-
nouncements, dissemination of information and an internal Shariah compli-
ance review.”6  “Shariah compliance” is “to describe financial activities and 
investments that comply with Islamic law which prohibits the charging of 
interest and involvement in any enterprise associated with activities and 
products forbidden by Islamic law.”7
Since Shariah is the backbone and foundation for the existence of the 
Islamic banking and finance industry, Islamic finance experts assert Shariah 
governance should be considered as the single most important distinction 
between a conventional and an Islamic financial institution.   But, the termi-
nology of Shariah governance is not easy to understand for persons who live 
in conventional finance.
Against this background, this paper intends to examine the relation 
between corporate governance and Shariah governance, and how those gov-
ernance concepts are handled at Islamic Financial Institutions.   Definition 
of corporate governance is presented in Section 1 followed by a compara-
tive analysis of conventional and Islamic Financial Institutions in Section 
2.   Section 3 reviews Shariah governance at Islamic Financial Institutions by 
comparing the guidelines issued by Bank Negara Malaysia and Islamic Fi-
nancial Services Board.   In order to clarify Shariah compliant risks vis-a-vis 
Shariah governance, we highlight three case studies in Section 4.   Section 5 
concludes the paper.
Section 1:  Definition of Corporate Governance
The word “governance” usually means “corporate governance” to persons 
in conventional finance.   In this section, we first begin with an examina-
tion of the concept of corporate governance from Organization of Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD).   We then review the concept of 
corporate governance at conventional banks, which is shown in guidelines 
announced by Bank for International Settlements (BIS).   This comparison is 
intended to clarify how the concept of corporate governance advocated by 
OECD and BIS, respectively, is related.   The best known concept of corpo-
rate governance in the Western world is the one announced by the OECD in 
June 2004.   The OECD concept comprises six frameworks.
First, Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance frame-
6.  Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), 2009, IFSB-10, Kuala Lumpur.
7.  QFinance’s Dictionary, “Definition of Shari’ah Compliant” www.qfinance.com  retrieved 
on November 1, 2013.
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work: the corporate governance framework should promote transparent 
and efficient markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articu-
late the division of responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory 
and enforcement authorities.   
Second, the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions: the 
corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise 
of shareholders’ rights.
Third, the equitable treatment of shareholders: the corporate gover-
nance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, 
including minority and foreign shareholders.   All shareholders should have 
the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights.
Fourth, the role of stakeholders in corporate governance: the corpo-
rate governance framework should recognize the rights of stakeholders 
established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-
operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, 
and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises.
Fifth, disclosure and transparency: the corporate governance frame-
work should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all ma-
terial matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, 
performance, ownership, and governance of the company.
Six, the responsibilities of the board: the corporate governance frame-
work should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective 
monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to 
the company and the shareholders.
In the conventional financial world, the most widely accepted concept 
of corporate governance is that issued by the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision (the BIS-Committee) at BIS.   Actually, the BIS-Committee 
issued two guidelines on corporate governance.   The first, “Enhancing 
corporate governance for banking organizations,” was announced in February 
2006 and the second, “Principles for enhancing corporate governance,” was an-
nounced in October 2010.
The BIS-Committee’s 2010 guideline refers to the OECD principles as 
follows.
“The Committee’s 2006 guideline drew from principles of corporate 
governance that were published in 2004 by OECD.   The OECD’s widely ac-
cepted and long-established principles aim to assist governments in their 
efforts to evaluate and improve their frameworks for corporate governance 
and to provide guidance for participants and regulators of financial mar-
kets.” 
The BIS-Committee’s 2010 guideline summarizes the OECD principles 
as follows.
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“The OECD principles define corporate governance as involving a set 
of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its sharehold-
ers, and other stakeholders.   Corporate governance also provides the struc-
ture through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means 
of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. 
Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board 
and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the com-
pany and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring.   The 
presence of an effective corporate governance system, within an individual 
company or group and across an economy as a whole, helps to provide a de-
gree of confidence that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market 
economy.” (emphasis added by author).
This summary comes from the Preamble of the OECD report in 2004, 
not from the six major frameworks of corporate governance issued by 
OECD.   The wording in the Preamble sounds more like “Wall Street” than 
“Main Street.”   It talks about “incentives and monitoring,” which invokes 
a “carrot and whip” relation between management and board members.   It 
also mentions, “the proper functioning of a market economy,” which does 
not appear in the six frameworks of the OECD’s concept of corporate gover-
nance.   The BIS’s stance on corporate governance here seems somewhat re-
laxed, and we cannot totally dismiss the suspicion that such a loose stance 
on corporate governance may have triggered the Bear Sterns crisis in March 
2008 and the Lehman crisis in September 2008 in the Western financial in-
dustry.   If BIS had adhered to the six principles of OECD, BIS would have 
had tighter control over the world’s financial institutions.
Section 2:  Corporate Governance in Conventional and Islamic Financial 
Institutions
We continue our review of the BIS-Committee’s guidance.   In the 2010 up-
date, we can find that the BIS-Committee placed focus on six issues.
First, board practices: the board should actively carry out its overall re-
sponsibility for the bank, including its business and risk strategy, organiza-
tion, financial soundness and governance.   The board should also provide 
effective oversight of senior management.
Second, senior management: under the direction of the board, senior 
management should ensure that the bank’s activities are consistent with 
the business strategy, risk tolerance/appetite and policies approved by the 
board.
Third, risk management and internal controls: a bank should have a 
risk management function (including a chief risk officer (CRO) or equivalent 
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for large banks and internationally active banks), a compliance function 
and an internal audit function, each with sufficient authority, stature, inde-
pendence, resources and access to the board.
Fourth, compensation: the bank should fully implement the Financial 
Stability Board’s (FSB- formerly the Financial Stability Forum) Principles for 
Sound Compensation Practices (FSB Principles).   
Fifth, complex or opaque corporate structure: the board and senior 
management should know, understand and guide the bank’s overall corpo-
rate structure and its evolution, ensuring that the structure (and the entities 
that form the structure) is justified and does not involve undue or inappro-
priate complexity.
Sixth, disclosure and transparency: transparency is one tool to help 
emphasize and implement the main principles for good corporate gover-
nance.
The working group on Corporate Governance of the Committee at 
BIS is comprised of the following 25 members.   Among them, 20 members 
are from 15 countries viz., Belgium, China, France (2 representatives), Ger-
many (2 representatives), Italy, Japan (2 representatives), Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA 
(4 representatives).   The rest are composed from representatives from four 
international institutions viz. EC, OECD, World Bank, Financial Stability In-
stitute and one secretariat from the Committee.   It should be noted that one 
member is from an Islamic country viz. Saudi Arabia.   This member must 
act as a pipeline between conventional finance countries and Islamic coun-
tries.
Then, how is the concept of corporate governance understood in Is-
lamic finance?   We take Malaysia as an example of an Islamic country, as 
Malaysia is regarded as a leader in Islamic finance.   Bank Negara Malaysia 
(BNM), the central bank of Malaysia, issued Guidelines on Corporate Gov-
ernance for Licensed Institutions on December 24, 2010.   This Guideline has 
been amended on June 19, 2013 (the Guidelines).8
Corporate
Governance
General
Concepts
(OECD)
Corporate
Governance
at
Financial
Institutions
(BIS)
Corporate
Governance
at
Islamic
Financial
Instituions
(BNM)
Guidance to
Licensed
Institutions
Guidance to
Licensed
Islamic
Banks
Diagram 1:  Transmission of governance concept 
             Source: complied by author
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Diagram 1 shows the transmission of the governance concept from 
OECE to Islamic financial institutions.
The BNM’s Guidelines, in the section of “Alignment with other corpo-
rate governance codes,” state as follows.
1.05 The broad principles, standards and requirements under the Guide-
lines are aligned with the principles enshrined in:
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance;
The BIS Guidelines on “Enhancing Corporate Governance for Bank-
ing Organizations;” and
Other international best practices on corporate governance.
(emphasis is added by author)
Consequently, it is clear that BNM has adopted BIS’s guidelines, so let’s 
see the details of the Guidance.   
1.06 The Guidelines are formulated based on the fundamental concepts of 
responsibility, accountability and transparency, with greater empha-
sis on the role of the board and management.   The Guidelines high-
light the principles of corporate governance that are translated into 
minimum standards and specific requirements.
1.07 The Guideline contains broad principles dealing with
(i)  Board matters;
(ii)  Management oversight;
(iii)  Accountability and audit; and
(iv)  Transparency.
Now let us compare the principles of corporate governance at BIS and 
BNM.   The comparison of BIS and BNM’s Guidelines of Corporate Gover-
nance is shown in Table 1.   
The principles on the Guidelines of BNM are quite similar to those 
of BIS.   Both place strong emphasis on (i) board, (ii) management and (iv) 
transparency.   While BNM highlights (iii) accountability and audit more 
than BIS, BIS puts more emphasis on risk management and compensation.
BNM issued guidelines to Islamic Banks, called “Guidelines on Cor-
porate Governance for Licensed Islamic Banks9,” at the same time it issued 
guidelines to conventional banks.   A comparison of the principles of BNM’s 
guidelines to Licensed Institutions and to Licensed Islamic Banks is shown 
in Table 2.   
8.  Guideline on Corporate Governance for Licensed Institutions (BNM/RH/GL 001-1). Is-
sued on December 24, 2010, amended on June 19, 2013.
9.  Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), Guidance on Corporate Governance for Licensed Islamic Banks 
(BNM/RH/GL 002-1). Issued on February 28, 2011, amended on June 19, 2013, Kuala Lumpur.
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Table 1    BIS and BNM’s Guidelines of Corporate Governance
BIS
Principles for enhancing 
corporate governance
2010/10     
BNM
Guidelines on Corporate Governance 
for Lisenced Institutions
2010/12/24
Principle 
1:
Board practices: Board overall 
responsibilities                                                                                                       
The board has overall responsibility 
for the bank, including approving 
and overseeing the implementation 
of the bank's strategic objectives, risk 
strategy, corporate geovernance and 
corporate values. The board is also 
responsible for providing oversight of 
senior management.
Principle 
1:
Board Responsibilities, Board 
Committees, Shariah Committee                        
Every Licesed Institution should be 
headed by an effective board, which 
assumes specific responsibilites. The 
vision, strategy and corporate values 
of the Licensed Institution should be 
clearly specified and understood
Principle 
2:
Boards practices: Board qualifications 
Board members should be and remain 
qualified, including through training,    
for their positions. They should have 
a clear understanding of their role in 
corporate governance and be able to 
exercise sound and objective 
judgement about the affairs of the 
bank.
Principle 
2:
Board Composition, Types of Directors        
There should be an effective board 
composition, with a strong 
independent element where no 
individual or small group of 
individuals should be allowed to 
dominate the board's decision making
Principle 
3:
Board Practices: Board's own 
practice and structure                                                
The board should define appropriate 
governance practices for its own work 
and have in place the means to ensure 
that such practices are followed and 
periodically reviewed for ongoing 
improvement.
Principle 
3:
Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer (CEO)                                                                           
There should be a clear division of 
responsibilities at the helm of an 
Licensed Institution, which will 
ensure a balanced and clear lines 
of role, responsibility, authority 
and accountability throughout the 
Licensed Instutuion.
Principle 
4:
Board practices: Group structure
In a group structure, the board of 
the parent company has the overall 
responsibility for adequate corporate 
governance across the group and 
ensuring that there are governance 
policies and mechanisms appropriate 
to the structure, business and risks of 
the group and its entities.
Principle 
4:
Appointment
There should be a formal and 
transparent process for the 
appointment of directors to the 
board and the appointment of Chief 
Executive Officer
Principle 
5:
Senior Management                                                              
Under the direction of the board, 
senior management should ensure that 
the bank's activities are consistent with 
the business strategy, risk tolerance/
appetite and policies approved by the 
board.
Principle 
5:
Qualifications                                                                    
Directors must be persons of calibre, 
credibility and integrity with the 
necessary skills and experience and be 
able to devote time and commitment
Principle 
6:
Risk management and internal controls
Banks should have an effective 
internal controls system and a risk 
management function (including 
a chief risk officer or equivalent) 
with sufficient authority, stature, 
independence, resources and access to 
the board.
Principle 
6:
Board meetings                                                                   
Board should meet regularly and be 
duly furnished with complete and 
timely information
Principle 
7:
 Risks should be identified and 
monitored on an ongoing firm-wide 
and individual entity basis, and 
the sophistication of the bank's risk 
management and internal control 
infrastructures should keep pace with 
any changes to the bank's risk profile 
(including its growth), and to the 
external risk landscape.
Principle 
7:
Board performance                                                               
There should be a formal and 
an ongoing assessment of the 
effectiveness of the board as a whole, 
the directors and the Chief Executive 
Officer
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 any changes to the bank's risk profile 
(including its growth), and to the 
external risk landscape.
Principle 
8:
Effective risk management requires 
robust internal communication within 
the bank about risk, both across the 
organisation and through reporting to 
the board and senior management. Principle 
8:
Renumeration                                                                    
There should be a formal and 
transparent procedure for fixing the 
remuneration packages of board 
members, Chief Executive Officer 
and senior management and the 
remuneration policies and practices 
should be in line with the Licensed 
Institution's ethical values, objectives 
and culture
Principle 
9:
The board and senior management 
should effectively utilise the work 
conducted by internal audit functions, 
external auditors and internal control 
functions.
Principle 
9:
Conflict of Interest                                                               
Persons empowered with decision 
making authority (including directors) 
should exercise care to avoid situations 
that may give rise to a conflict of 
interest situation
Principle 
10:
Compensation                                                                   
The board should actively oversee the 
compensation system's design and 
operation, and should monitor and 
review the compensation system to 
ensure that it operates as intended.
Principle 
10:
Separation between shareholders and 
management
There should be clear separation 
between shareholders and 
management so as not to impede 
sound corporate governmance
Principle 
11:
An empolyee's compensation should 
be effectively aligned with prudent 
risk taking: compensation should 
be adjusted for all types of risk; 
compensation outcomes should 
be symmetric with risk outcomes; 
compensation payout schedules 
should be sensitive to the time horizon 
of risks; and the mix of cash, equity 
and other forms compensation should 
be consistent with risk alignment.
Principle 
11:
Audit Committee, Internal Audit, 
External Audit
There should be robust auditing 
requirements and the auditor, board 
and management need to maintain 
professional and objective relationship
Principle 
12:
Complex or opaque corporate structure
The board and senior management 
should know and understand the 
bank's operational structure and the 
risks that it poses (ie "know-your-
structure").
Principle 
12:
Communication                                                                  
Licensed Institution should engage 
in regular, effective and fair 
communication with shareholders/
stakeholders
Principle 
13:
Where a bank operates through 
special-purpose or related structures 
or in jurisdictions that impede 
transparency or do not meet 
international banking standards, its 
board and senior management should 
understand the purpose, structure 
and unique risks of these operations. 
They should also seek to mitigate the 
risks identified (ie "understand-your-
structure").
Principle 
13:
Comprehensive disclosure 
requirement, on the Board, on the 
Committees
Conducting corporate governance in 
a transparent manner can reinforce 
sound corporate governance
Principle 
14:
Disclosure and Transparency                                    
The governance of the bank should be 
adequately transparent to its 
shareholders, depositors, other 
relevant stakeholders and market 
participants.
Principle 
14:
Disclosure on risks, monitoring and 
internal control
Board is collectively responsible and 
accountable for the veracity of 
disclosures and management of risk
Source: Compiled by author based on BIS and BNM guidelines
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Table 2    The principles of BNM’s guidelines to Licensed Institutions and to Licensed Islamic Banks
BNM                                                         
Guidelines on Corporate Governance 
for Lisenced Institutions
2010/12/24     
BNM                                                         
Guidelines on Corporate Governance  
for Lisenced Islamic Banks
2011/2/28
Principle 
1:
Board Responsibilities, Board 
Committees, Shariah Committee                         
Every Licesed Institution should be 
headed by an effective board, which 
assumes specific responsibilites. The 
vision, strategy and corporate values 
of the Licensed Institution should be 
clearly specified and understood
Principle 
1:
Board Responsibilities, Board 
Committees, Shariah Committee              
Every Islamic bank should be headed 
by an effective board, which assumes 
specific responsibilites. The vision, 
strategy and corporate values of 
the Islamic bank should be clearly 
specified and understood
Principle 
2:
Board Composition, Types of Directors 
There should be an effective 
board composition, with a strong 
independent element where no 
individual or small group of 
individuals should be allowed to 
dominate the board's decision making
Principle 
2:
Board Composition, Types of Directors    
There should be an effective board 
composition, with a strong independent 
element where no individual or small 
group of individuals should be allowed 
to dominate the board's decision making
Principle 
3:
Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) 
There should be a clear division of 
responsibilities at the helm of an 
Licensed Institution, which will 
ensure a balanced and clear lines 
of role, responsibility, authority 
and accountability throughout the 
Licensed Institution.
Principle 
3:
Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO)
There should be a clear division of 
responsibilities at the helm of an 
Islamic bank, which will ensure 
a balanced and clear lines of role, 
responsibility, authority and 
accountability throughout the Islamic 
bank
Principle 
4:
Appointment                                                                     
There should be a formal and 
transparent process for the 
appointment of directors to the 
board and the appointment of Chief 
Executive Officer
Principle 
4:
Appointment                                                                     
There should be a formal and 
transparent process for the 
appointment of directors to the 
board and the appointment of Chief 
Executive Officer
Principle 
5:
Qualifications                                                                    
Directors must be persons of calibre, 
credibility and integrity with the 
necessary skills and experience and be 
able to devote time and commitment
Principle 
5:
Qualifications                                                                    
Directors must be persons of calibre, 
credibility and integrity with the 
necessary skills and experience and be 
able to devote time and commitment
Principle 
6:
Board meetings                                                                   
Board should meet regularly and be duly 
furnished with complete and timely 
information
Principle 
6:
Board meetings                                                                  
Board should meet regularly and be 
duly furnished with complete and 
timely information
Principle 
7:
Board performance                                                                  
There should be a formal and 
an ongoing assessment of the 
effectiveness of the board as a whole, 
the directors and the Chief Executive 
Officer
Principle 
7:
Board performance                                                               
There should be a formal and 
an ongoing assessment of the 
effectiveness of the board as a whole, 
the directors and the Chief Executive 
Officer
Principle 
8:
Renumeration                                                                    
There should be a formal and 
transparent procedure for fixing the 
remuneration packages of board 
members, Chief Executive Officer 
and senior management and the 
remuneration policies and practices 
should be in line with the Licensed 
Institution's ethical values, objectives 
and culture
Principle 
8:
Renumeration                                                                    
There should be a formal and 
transparent procedure for fixing the 
remuneration packages of board 
members, Chief Executive Officer 
and senior management and the 
remuneration policies and practices 
should be in line with the Islamic 
bank's ethical values, objectives and 
culture
Principle 
9:
Conflict of Interest                                                               
Persons empowered with decision 
making authority (including directors) 
should exercise care to avoid situations 
that may give rise to a conflict of 
interest situation
Principle 
9:
Conflict of Interest                                                               
Persons empowered with decision 
making authority (including directors) 
should exercise care to avoid situations 
that may give rise to a conflict of 
interest situation
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Principle 
9:
making authority (including directors) 
should exercise care to avoid situations 
that may give rise to a conflict of 
interest situation
Principle 
9:
making authority (including directors) 
should exercise care to avoid situations 
that may give rise to a conflict of 
interest situation
Principle 
10:
Separation between shareholders 
and management
There should be clear separation 
between shareholders and 
management so as not to impede 
sound corporate governmance
Principle 
10:
Separation between shareholders and 
management
There should be clear separation 
between shareholders and 
management so as not to impede 
sound corporate governmance
Principle 
11:
Audit Committee, Internal Audit, 
External Audit
There should be robust auditing 
requirements and the auditor, board 
and management need to maintain 
professional and objective relationship
Principle 
11:
Audit Committee, Internal Audit, 
External Audit
There should be robust auditing 
requirements and the auditor, board 
and management need to maintain 
professional and objective relationship
Principle 
12:
Communication                                                                  
Licensed Institution should 
engage in regular, effective and fair 
communication with shareholders/
stakeholders
Principle 
12:
Communication                                                                  
Islamic bank should engage in regular, 
effective and fair communication with 
shareholders/stakeholders
Principle 
13:
Comprehensive disclosure 
requirement, on the Board, on the 
Committees
Conducting corporate governance in 
a transparent manner can reinforce 
sound corporate governance
Principle 
13:
Comprehensive disclosure 
requirement, on the Board, on the 
Committees
Conducting corporate governance in 
a transparent manner can reinforce 
sound corporate governance
Principle 
14:
Disclosure on risks, monitoring and 
internal control
Board is collectively responsible 
and accountable for the veracity of 
disclosures and management of risk
Principle 
14:
Disclosure on risks, monitoring and 
internal control
Board is collectively responsible 
and accountable for the veracity of 
disclosures and management of risk
Source: Compiled by author based on BNM guidelines 
Surprisingly, the principles are exactly the same except for the wording 
of “Licensed Institutions” and “Licensed Islamic Banks.”  Apart from the 
14 principles that everyone pays attention to, a careful examination of the 
body of the guidelines reveals differences in handling Shariah issues.   In 
the guidelines to conventional banks, there is no mention of Shariah issues. 
The guidance on Licensed Islamic Banks, however, has extensive descrip-
tion of Shariah issues.   
Importance of Corporate Governance
1.04 (iv) Align corporate activities and behaviors with the expectation that 
institutions will operate in a safe and sound manner, and in compli-
ance with the Shariah and the applicable laws and regulations; 
Part 2: Principles of Corporate Governance
2.02 The board carries ultimate responsibility for the proper stewardship 
of its Islamic bank.   It has the responsibility in ensuring the maxi-
mization of shareholders’ value and safeguarding the stakeholders’ 
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interests.   This could be done through rigorous and diligent oversight 
over the Islamic bank’s affairs, establishing, amongst others, Shariah 
compliance, the corporate value, vision and strategy that will direct 
the activities of the Islamic bank, and to be aware of the types of ma-
terial financial activities the Islamic bank intends to pursue.
Major Responsibilities of the Board
2.10 (vi) Institute comprehensive policies, processes and infrastructure to 
ensure Shariah compliance in all aspects of the Islamic bank’s opera-
tions, products and activities.
The board should establish a Shariah Committee and institute com-
prehensive policies, processes and infrastructure for the purpose 
of ensuring that the business operations of the Islamic bank is con-
ducted in accordance with Shariah principles.   The compliance with 
Shariah principles is an integral feature in the Islamic bank.   A com-
prehensive and effective Shariah framework is imperative in assuring 
such compliance.   The appointment and reappointment of the Shariah 
Committee member requires prior written approval of Bank Negara 
Malaysia.   In approving the appointment and reappointment, Bank 
Negara Malaysia may impose necessary conditions it deems fit in ad-
dition to the requirements in the Shariah Governance Framework for 
Islamic Financial Institutions
       (vii) Set up an effective internal audit department, staffed with quali-
fied internal audit personnel to perform internal audit functions, cov-
ering the financial, management and Shariah audit.
 
Shariah Committee
2.19 In addition to the board committee, the board is required to establish 
a Shariah Committee.
Internal Audit
2.99 The internal audit function is an important part of any effective inter-
nal control and risk management system because it provides an inde-
pendent assessment of the adequacy of, and compliance with, estab-
lished policies and procedures.   In addition, internal auditors should 
review and evaluate the reliability, adequacy and effectiveness of the 
Islamic bank’s internal control.   The scope of internal audit should 
cover financial, management and Shariah audit.
2.100 The internal audit function should complement the Shariah Commit-
tee in ensuring Shariah compliance in all aspects of the Islamic bank’s 
products, operations and activities.   The internal auditors, in consul-
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tation with the Shariah Committee, shall determine the scope of Sha-
riah audit and are encouraged to produce internal Shariah compliant 
reports.   The internal auditors shall acquire the relevant and appro-
priate training to enhance their Shariah compliance review skills.
Comprehensive Disclosure Requirement
2.110    Shariah Committee
(i) Key information and background of Shariah Committee members 
(including name, qualification and experience);
(ii) Terms of reference of the Shariah Committee;
(iii) Roles and responsibilities of the Shariah Committee;
(iv) Number of Shariah Committee meetings held in that year.   Is-
lamic banks are encouraged to disclose information on the num-
ber of meetings attended by each member of the committee; and
(v) Endorsement by the Shariah Committee on the conformity of the 
Islamic bank’s operations in accordance with Shariah principles.
(all underlines are added by the author for emphasis)
Having analyzed those points on Shariah issues, we can highlight the 
following findings from the Guidelines on Licensed Islamic Banks by BNM.
First, “Shariah Governance” is mentioned briefly in 1.04 only.   It does 
not explain what Shariah governance is.   It only states the importance of 
Shariah compliance.
Second, Shariah compliance is discussed in detail.   Sharia compliance 
is the number one priority exceeding corporate values, vision and strategy 
at Islamic banks.
Third, Shariah committee should be installed within the organization 
at licensed Islamic banks as a pivotal organization in Shariah compliance, 
and the members of the Shariah committee should be approved by BNM.
Fourth, there is a strong emphasis on internal audits, which are expect-
ed to cover financial, management and Shariah audit.
Our analysis of the relation between governance at conventional banks 
and Islamic banks can be summarized as follows in Diagram 2.
Diagram 2:  Relation between Governance in Conventional Banks and Islamic Banks 
                     Source: complied by author
Governance
of
Conventional
Financial
Institutions
Shariah
Compliance
Governance
of
Islamic
Financial
Institutions
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Section 3: Shariah Governance at Islamic Financial Institutions
In order to clarify the difference between Shariah governance and Shariah 
compliance, we would like to review the definition of Shariah governance.
BNM issued guidelines on Shariah governance called “Shariah Gover-
nance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions (SGF).”   How is Shariah 
governance described in SGF?10
1 Introduction
1.1 Shariah principles are the foundation for the practice of Islamic finance 
through the observance of the tenets, conditions and principles es-
poused by Shariah.   Comprehensive compliance with Shariah principles 
would bring confidence to the general public and the financial markets 
on the credibility of Islamic finance operations.
1.2 Bank Negara Malaysia (the Bank) places great importance in ensuring 
that the overall Islamic financial system operates in accordance with 
Shariah principles.   This is to be achieved through the two-tier Shariah 
governance infrastructure comprising two (2) vital components, which 
are a centralized Shariah advisory body at the Bank and an internal 
Shariah Committee formed in each respective Islamic financial institu-
tion (IFI).
1.5 The Bank has developed the Shariah governance framework for IFIs 
with the primary objective of enhancing the role of the board, the Sha-
riah Committee and the management in relation to Shariah matters, 
including enhancing the relevant key organs having the responsibility 
to execute the Shariah compliance and research functions aimed at the 
attainment of a Shariah-based operating environment.
(emphasis is added by author)
Although 1.2 refers to a two-tier Shariah governance framework, there 
is no explanation of the meaning of Shariah governance in BNM’s guide-
lines.   All we can determine from BNM’s guidelines is that Shariah gover-
nance is the structure to implement Shariah compliance.
An international standard setting organization called the Islamic Fi-
nancial Services Board (IFSB) was established on March 10, 2003, by central 
banks of mostly Islamic countries.   IFSB’s council members are composed 
of the central banks of the following 20 countries: Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Brunei, Djibouti, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mal-
dives, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sudan, 
10.  Shari’ah Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions (BNM/RH/GL_012_3). 
Issued on October 26, 2013.
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Syria and UAE.    Also, the president of the Islamic Development Bank is a 
council member.   
The relation of IFSB to Islamic countries is similar to that of BIS to 
major financial countries.   IFSB issued “Guiding Principles on Shariah 
Governance Systems for Institutions offering Islamic Financial Services” in 
December 2009.   It states the Definition and Scope of Shariah Governance 
System as follows.
The term “Shariah Governance System”, despite being commonly used 
within the Islamic financial services industry (IFSI) to refer to structures 
and processes adopted by stakeholders in the IFSI (from financial regulators 
to market players) to ensure compliance with Shariah rules and principles, 
has not been properly defined in any of the existing standards.   In the inter-
ests of clarity, this document shall adopt the following definition of “Shariah 
Governance System” and other key terminology:
“Shariah Governance System” refers to the set of institutional and orga-
nizational arrangements through which an IIFS ensures that there is effec-
tive independent oversight of Shariah compliance over each of the following 
structures and processes:
(a) Issuance of relevant Shariah pronouncements/resolutions
(b) Dissemination of information on such Shariah pronouncements/reso-
lutions to the operative personnel of the IIFS who monitor the day-to-
day compliance with the Shariah pronouncements/resolutions vis-à-vis 
every level of operations and each transaction
(c) An internal Shariah compliance review/audit for verifying that Sha-
riah compliance has been satisfied, during which any incident of non-
compliance will be recorded and reported, and as far as possible, ad-
dressed and rectified
(d) An annual Shariah compliance review/audit for verifying that the inter-
nal Shariah compliance review/audit has been appropriately carried out 
and its findings have been duly noted by the Shariah board
IFSB illustrates the Shariah governance system as follows:
FUNCTIONS TYPICAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
ADDITIONS IN IIFS
 (Institutions offering Is-
lamic Financial Services)
Governance Board of directors Shariah board
Control Internal auditorExternal auditor
ISRU (Internal Shariah 
Review Unit)
Compliance
Regulatory and financial 
compliance officers, unit 
or department
ISCU (Internal Shariah 
Compliance Unit)
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Coming back to the SGF issued by BNM, SGF states the following prin-
ciples to implement a Shariah Governance Framework at an Islamic financial 
institution.
Principle 1: It is a duty and responsibility of an IFI to establish a sound 
and robust Shariah governance framework with emphasis placed on the 
roles of key functionalities in ensuring effective implementation of the 
Sharia governance framework.
Principle 2: An IFI shall set out the accountability and responsibility 
of every key functionary involved in the implementation of Shariah gover-
nance framework.
Principle 3: Independence of the Shariah Committee shall be observed 
at all times in exercising their duties to make objective and informed judg-
ments.
Principle 4: Any person bearing responsibilities outlined in the Shariah 
governance framework for an IFI shall possess the necessary competency 
and continuously enhance their knowledge and understanding on the Sha-
riah as well as keep abreast of the latest developments in Islamic finance.
Principle 5: Internal and privileged information obtained by the Shariah 
Committee members in the course of their duties shall be kept confidential 
at all times and shall not be misused.
Principle 6: Professional ethics, judgment and consistency shall be 
maintained in ensuring Shariah compliance.
Principle 7: There shall be a robust Shariah compliance function, com-
prising review and audit functions, supported by a risk management con-
trol process and internal research capacity.   (emphasis is added by author)
Under Principle 1, the minimum composition of the Shariah governance 
framework is explained as follows:
2.4  The Shariah governance framework of an IFI shall, at the minimum, 
comprise the following:
 (i) Board oversight on Shariah compliance aspects of the IFI’s overall 
operations.   The board is ultimately responsible for the establish-
ment of an appropriate Shariah governance framework on an IFI. 
In setting up the Shariah governance framework, the board is ex-
pected to understand the Shariah non-compliance risks associated 
with Islamic finance business and the issues relating to such risks, 
as well as the potential implications to the institution;
 (ii) A Shariah Committee with qualified members who are able to de-
liberate Islamic finance issues brought before them and provide 
sound Shariah decisions.   In this regard, every IFI is required to 
establish a Sharia Committee of which the majority shall comprise 
persons with appropriate qualifications and experience in Shariah;
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 (iii) Effective management responsibilities in providing adequate re-
sources and capable manpower support to every function involved 
in the implementation of Shariah governance, in order to ensure 
that the execution of business operations are in accordance with 
the Shariah;
 (iv) An internal Shariah review that is conducted on a continuous basis, 
which is a review of processes and deliverables, as well as deter-
mining that such processes and outcomes satisfy the needs of the 
Shariah;
 (v) A regular Shariah audit, at least on an annual basis, verifying that 
the IFI’s key functions and business operations comply with Sha-
riah;
 (vi) A Shariah risk management process to identify all possible Shariah 
non-compliance risks and, where appropriate, remedial measures 
that need to be taken to reduce the risk;
 (vii)  An internal Shariah research team to conduct research on Shariah; 
and
 (viii)  Issuance and dissemination of Shariah decisions to the relevant 
stakeholders.
        (emphasis is added by author)
Also, under Principle 2, BNM’s intention to integrate Shariah with IFI’s 
business direction is shown as follows.   It may take time to know whether 
this will indeed be effective.
2.4 The Board may consider appointing at least one (1) member of the Sha-
riah Committee as a member of the board that could serve as ‘bridge’ 
between the board and the Shariah Committee.   The presence of a di-
rector with sound Shariah knowledge would foster greater understand-
ing and appreciation amongst the board members on the decisions 
made by the Shariah Committee.
As a summary of the above-mentioned minimum requirements, 
BNM’s SGF provides the following diagram (Diagram 3) to show the rela-
tion of each element.   In addition, The governance framework at conven-
tional banks, which summarizes the guidelines issued by BIS, is shown in 
Diagram 4.
Diagram 3 clearly tells us that Shariah governance is not only a com-
prehensive concept but also a superior concept in managing Shariah banks. 
Shariah governance is the governance framework to make the bank account-
11.  The Committee of Sponsoring Organization of Treadway Commission (COSO) “Internal 
Control-Integrated Framework” announced in 1992, amended in 2013.
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Diagram 3:  Shariah Governance Framework Model for Islamic Fin. Institutions
Diagram 4:  Governance Framework Model for Conventional Banks
Source: BNM’s SGF
Shariah
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compliance
Board Audit 
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Management
-Ensure executions of business & operations are 
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monitor, report & 
control Shariah non-
compliance risk
Shariah Review 
Function
Review business 
operations on regular 
basis to ensure Shariah
compliance
Shariah Research 
Function
Conduct in-depth 
Shariah research prior 
to submission to the 
Shariah Committee
Shariah Audit 
Function
Provide independent 
assessment & objective 
assurance designed to 
value add & improve IFI’s 
compliance with Shariah
Shariah Compliance and Research Functions
Conventional Framework
Board Risk
Management 
Committee
Board
Overall oversight on 
governance structure 
and compliance
Board Audit 
CommitteeBoard Compliance 
Committee
Oversight accountability 
on compliance issues
Management
-Ensure executions of business & operations are 
in accordance with good internal control
- Provide necessary support to the Board 
Committee
Risk Management 
Control Function
Identify, measure, 
monitor, report & 
control Shariah non-
compliance risk
Compliance Function
Review business 
operations on regular 
basis to ensure 
compliance
Audit Function
Provide independent 
assessment & objective 
assurance designed to 
value add & improve IFI’s 
internal control
Compensation Committee
Nomination Committee  
Source: complied by author
78 RJIS ［Vol. 22, No. 1
able in the eyes of God.   The framework of Shariah governance implementa-
tion is similar to the COSO Internal Control framework11.
Under the COSO Internal Control-Integrated Framework, a widely 
used global framework, internal control is defined as a process, effected by 
an entity’s board of directors, management, and other personnel, designed 
to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives 
in the following categories: a) Effectiveness and efficiency of operations; b) 
Reliability of financial reporting; and c) Compliance with laws and regula-
tions.
COSO has five components: 1. Control Environment, 2. Risk Assess-
ment, 3. Information and Communications, 4. Control Activities and 5. 
Monitoring.   If an organization has installed those five components and 
when they are regarded as working properly, we can be reasonably assured 
that the objective of the organization is achieved.   
The approach taken by the BNM’s Shariah governance guideline is 
quite similar to that of COSO’s internal control framework.   The COSO in-
ternal control framework is shown in Diagram 5.
Section 4: Shariah Governance Survey and Shariah Compliant Risk
The empirical evidence of Shariah governance at Islamic financial institu-
tions is given by a survey of those institutions.   A book published in 2012 
gives us a clue to understanding the actual situation.   The survey, con-
ducted in 2009, was aimed at understanding the extent of current Shariah 
governance practices by examining its general approach; regulatory and 
internal framework; role of the Shariah board; attributes of the Shariah board 
Diagram 5:  COSO Internal Control Framework 
Source: www.coco.org retrieved on November 1, 2013
Monitoring
Operations
Financial Reporting
Compliance
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in terms of independence, competence, transparency and confidentiality; 
operational procedures; and assessment of the Shariah board.   The result 
shows the formality of the Shariah governance framework, but it does not 
give us information how effective Shariah governance is in managing ac-
countability to God12.
When we talk about Shariah governance, we always mention Shariah 
compliant risk, but what are practical examples of such risks?   In this chap-
ter, we analyze three cases.
Case 1.    Sukuk issuance from Malaysia based on the Islamic contract of 
Murabahah and Bai Bithaman Ajil (BBA)
Sukuk are Shariah compliant fixed income instruments with features that 
resemble bonds in the conventional market.   They are widely used as a Sha-
riah compliant method for raising capital and may be structured around a 
variety of Islamic contracts.
The earliest form of Sukuk originated from Malaysia were based on the Is-
lamic contract of Murabahah and BBA whereby the sale contract between 
the Issuer and the Investors / Sukuk-holders consequently results in a debt 
obligation from the Issuer.   In Malaysia, Murabahah Sukuk were utilized 
primarily for short term issuance whilst BBA Sukuk were employed pri-
marily for longer term issuances.   Although approved by the Shariah Advi-
sory Council of both regulatory bodies i.e. the Bank Negara Malaysia (the 
Malaysian Central Bank, BNM) and the Securities Commission of Malaysia 
(SC), the usage of the Malaysian version of Murabahah and BBA was not 
accepted elsewhere.   This raised questions on standardization of Sukuk 
structures particularly in view of the fact that Shariah scholars from Malay-
sia also sits on Shariah Boards of Islamic financial institutions outside of Ma-
laysia where the Malaysian version of Murabahah and BBA was prohibited.  
Despite the divergence, BNM and the SC continued to allow the use of Mu-
rabahah and BBA, the Malaysian Sukuk market began to gravitate towards 
a more universally acceptable Islamic structures and the use of Murabahah 
and BBA began to decline considerably as more counterparties shied away 
from its usage.   
Recent survey by Rating Agency Malaysia on Sukuk shows the issuance of 
BBA Sukuk is almost non-existent today.   However Murabahah Sukuk con-
tinues to be in practice, this may have been structured to be more univer-
sally accepted by Shariah scholars.   
12.  Zulkifili Hassan, 2012, Shari’ah Governance in Islamic Banks, Edinburgh University Press.
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Case 2.    The Goldman Sachs proposed Sukuk
In 2011, Goldman Sachs announced its intention to issue a $2 billion Sukuk 
program.   Goldman Sachs registered its Sukuk program with the Irish 
Stock Exchange and set up a special-purpose vehichle in the Cayman Is-
lands.   HSBC had earlier successfully issued a $500 million Sukuk in a mar-
ket environment where demand for premium rated Sukuk exceeds supply. 
The general perception at that stage was that the Goldman Sachs Sukuk 
would be equally successful.
But Goldman’s plan ran into controversy among Islamic scholars and 
analysts, who questioned whether the U.S. investment bank was obeying 
religious principles.   Two issues that received widespread attention were 
in connection with Shariah compliance, firstly whether the proceeds from 
the Sukuk would be utilized to fund non- Shariah compliant activities and 
secondly whether the Murabahah structure that Goldman Sachs opted 
meets the standard Shariah requirements.   There were also confusion as to 
whether or not the proposed Goldman Sachs Sukuk received approval from 
Shariah scholars.   Some scholars reported that the fatwa was already issued, 
while other scholars involved said that they did not sign off on the fatwa, 
which contradicted what Goldman Sachs and its advisors were saying.   By 
this time however the damage in the eyes of Shariah compliant investors 
was already done.   The Sukuk was never issued and the prospectus on the 
Irish Stock Exchange was past its 12-months validity period13.   
Case 3.   Islamic Total Return Swap (Wa’ad) Arrangement 
The Islamic Total Return Swap, also known as the Shariah Conversion 
Technology and the dual Wa’ad contract first surfaced in 2007 and were of-
fered by several Islamic banks.   However, it is perhaps better known in the 
Islamic finance industry as an Islamic investment product that originated 
from Deutsche Bank.   The product provides investments into Shariah com-
pliant assets which then swap the returns from the Shariah compliant assets 
with a hedge fund index which can contain conventional or non- Shariah 
compliant underlying assets, in order to enhance the returns from the origi-
nal Shariah compliant investments.   
The assets the clients invested in directly are Shariah compliant, which en-
abled this product to obtain approval from its Shariah Board.   The swap 
however is referenced to a hedge fund index that may or may not be Sharia 
compliant.   This second leg of the transaction is less obvious and was a sub-
13.  Several articles on Goldman’s sukuk issuance, such as “Islamic Finance: Islamic Sukuk 
by Goldman Sacks Causes Debate” Reuters, Feb 23, 2012; and “Shari’ah adviser of Ill-fated Gold-
man Sachs sukuk closed down” Euroweek, Jan 30, 2013.
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ject of debate among Shariah scholars.   A research paper by Sheikh Yusuf 
Talal DeLorenzo, a Shariah Board member of AAOIFI raised concerns that 
the underlying asset for the swap i.e. the hedge fund index would open the 
floodgate for all manner of non- Shariah compliant investments that could 
potentially give better returns than Shariah compliant investments and is 
therefore attractive, by simply adopting this swap mechanism.   Deutsche 
Bank, however, argued that the product allows Islamic investors to widen 
its investment exposure to a far wider universe of investment assets that 
were not available to Islamic investors previously.   Nonetheless overtime, 
the product slowly fell out of favor after doubts were cast on its Shariah au-
thenticity.   
The above three cases show that Shariah compliance risk is primarily a re-
sult of contradictions in opinions among Shariah scholars.   Academic study 
has not yet advanced to the point to analyze these situations further.
Conclusion
We compared several governance concepts.   The concept of governance 
first started from the OECD, was transferred to BIS, and then transferred to 
BNM.
Shariah governance is accountability to God, which is the first priority 
at Islamic banks.   The guidelines of Shariah governance mainly deal with 
Shariah compliance.   Creating an internal control framework for Shariah 
compliance is the way to in install a Shariah governance system.
We would like to mention recent examples of deficiency in governance. 
We would like to point out the effectiveness of governance largely depends 
on society.   Recently, there have been two interesting examples: JP Morgan 
and Mizuho.
JP Morgan announced on October 11, 2013, that it had set aside $9.2 
billion to cover its mounting legal expenses, leading it to report its first 
quarterly loss under Jamie Dimon, JP Morgan’s chief executive.   Mr. Dimon 
described the legal expenses as “painful.”   JP Morgan has many problems 
with governance, and the following are just a few: (i) a $2 billion loss from 
a huge CDS position in London, nicknamed the “Whale in London;” (ii) 
manipulating energy prices, for which JPMorgan was charged a fine; (iii) 
a mortgage payment manipulation during 2008-2011 that JPMorgan was 
charged for.   Frequent misconduct is evidence of weak governance, but 
the CEO was not asked to resign because he contributed a large profit to JP 
Morgan.   Mass media has not been critical of Mr. Dimon.
The situation is quite different at Mizuho.   In October 2013, Mizuho 
Bank was found to have supplied car loans through its affiliate consumer 
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credit company, Orient Credit.   The total loan amount was 200 million yen 
(about $2 million) for 230 instances.   The Financial Services Agency, the 
governing authority on banks, cited the bank for allowing the loans to re-
main in place even after they were discovered at the end of 2010.   Japanese 
media was very critical of Mizuho, and Mizuho announced its plan to pun-
ish over 30 senior executives.   President Sato is subject to a half-year sus-
pension in pay.   Chairman Tsukamoto will step down from the bank.
The big difference between the U.S. and Japan is caused by the culture 
at the society.   Japanese society has a strong culture to follow rules, conse-
quently even minor violations lead to harsh criticism by the media.   In such 
an environment, governance is very effective.   In Japan, the oversight of a 
$2 million loan in a $500 billion portfolio led to the resignation of the chair-
man, which sounds ridiculous to Westerners.
In the U.S., Mr. Dimon says in his 2012 letter to the shareholders that 
“the problems were our fault, and it is our job to fix them.   In fact, I feel ter-
rible that we let our regulators down.”  He doesn’t apologize for his error. 
In such a culture, it may be difficult to expect self-governance.   
Muslim culture may differ from one country to another.   Even though 
Shariah governance and accountability to God is first priority, the effective-
ness of governance will differ country by country, depending on the people. 
In short, even if a perfect Shariah governance framework is installed, it is 
human conduct that is ultimately accountable to God.
In ending our study, we would like to mention recent developments 
in the concept of governance in the Western world.   The concept of gov-
ernance has developed into several advanced steps.   Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility (CSR) is now a well-known concept all over the world.   Let’s 
take the example of Ricoh, a Japanese business equipment manufacturing 
company.    The disclosure magazine of Ricoh mentions its CSR activity as 
follows.
The Ricoh Group is engaged in “two-tier” CSR activities based on the 
three ideas constituting the foundation of CSR specified in the chart be-
low: the first tier involves basic social responsibilities and the second tier 
involves voluntary social responsibilities.   We aim to build public trust 
through our first tier activities and enhance our attractiveness through 
second tier activities and by achieving these goals simultaneously to in-
crease the value of the company.   We develop and implement action plans 
focusing on the four key areas specified in our CSR Charter: integrity in 
corporate activities, harmony with the environment, respect for people, and 
harmony with society.
Ricoh’s explanation about the evolution of its CSR concept shows its 
clear dedication to solve social issues through improved CSR (Diagram 6) .   
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Michael Porter, a management strategist at Harvard University, has 
been advocating the concept of Creating Shared Value (CSV) as a way for 
large corporations to pursue not only economic benefits for the company 
but also social benefi ts for society in need14.
Compared to these ideas from the Western world, we are not knowl-
edgeable about expanded concepts of Shariah governance that would as-
sist in the attainment of social justice and welfare.   Those are, in fact, the 
original goals of Islamic fi nance, which diff erentiates it from a simple profi t-
seeking Western way of fi nancing.
In essence, Shariah governance is one of the cornerstones that will de-
termine how successful Islamic fi nance will be in the years to come.   It is in 
Shariah governance that we will fi nd the issue of whether Islamic fi nance is 
really Islamic (in terms of its achievement of social justice) or just a copy of 
Wall Street products with Islamic wrappings.
This paper has mainly focused on the Malaysian situation, as Malaysia 
is trying to position itself as the Islamic fi nancial center and there is a great 
volume of available data compared to other Islamic countries.   As such 
Diagram 6:  Ricoh’s idea on Improved CSR 
Source: Ricoh’s HP, http://www.ricoh.com/csr/activity/soc_harmony/, retrieved 
on November 13, 2013
14.  Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, January 2011, “Creating Shared Value”, Harvard Busi-
ness Review.
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our analysis has not yet dealt with actual Shariah governance practices at 
Islamic banks.   Therefore, our next step of study is to conduct fact-finding 
interviews and survey of several Islamic banks and investment companies 
to find out how they actually exercise Shariah governance.   Also, we would 
like to examine how they tackle issues of social justice and welfare through 
their financial services offerings15.
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